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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court transferred this matter to this Court pursuant to Rule
42(a), Utah R. App. P. and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4)- This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court correctly determined there was no issue of

material fact to prevent it from ruling as a matter of law that, Plaintiff/Appellee
Treena A. Withers ('Withers'5) , as the undisputed joint tenant of the subject real
property, was entitled to partition.
Standard of Review: The district court's order of summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness, and the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Orvis v. Johnson^ 2008
UT 2, If 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations omitted). The district cdurfs interpretation of a
statute is reviewed for correctness. Benrden v. Crofts 2001 UT 76,11 5, 31 P.3d 537.
II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering an equal

distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the property to the parties as joint tenants.
Standard of Review: Partition actions are inherently equitable and an
appellate court will not "substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial court merely

1

because [it] may find a different result would be more appropriate.55 Arthur v.
Choumos, 574 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1978). Trial courts are "accorded broad
discretion when fashioning [partition decrees], and the decree will be affirmed unless
the trial court abused its discretion. Gillmorv, Gillmor^ 657 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah
1982).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
A person who is a joint tenant or tenant in common with another of real
property may bring an action to partition the property for the benefit of each
tenant. An action for partition may require the sale of the property if it
appears that the partition cannot be made without prejudice to the owners.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1201(2008)
If the court determines that the property or any part of it cannot be
partitioned without great prejudice to the owners, the court may order the
property sold.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1212(l) (2008)
In all cases, the interest of joint tenants shall be equal and undivided.
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-5(4) (2008)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of the Case.

Withers and Defendant/Appellant Marc J. Jepsen ("Jepsen") were joint
tenants of a home located on six acres in Boulder, Utah ("Property"). The Property
2

is subject to zoning restrictions requiring a residence to be constructed on a least five
acres. Withers acquired her interest in the Property when Jepscn quit claimed the
property from himself to Withers and himself as unmarried joint tenants. Using the
Property as collateral, Withers and Jepsen, as unmarried individuals, applied for and
obtained a loan secured by a trust deed on the Property. For a period of time the
parties lived together on the Property, and both invested fundk to improve the
property. After the personal relationship between Withers and Jepsen ended,
Withers initiated this action to obtain her equal and undivided legal and financial
interest in the Property.
Withers filed a motion for summary judgment supported by her affidavit
("Affidavit55) setting forth admissible evidence establishing tljie joint tenancy and her
entitlement to partition. The Affidavit set forth the following material facts: 1) the
parties are joint tenants of the Property; 2) the Property consists of a house on six
acres; 3) there is a mortgage owing on the home and real property in the
approximate amount of $65,000.00; 4) the Property appraised for $175,000.00 in
approximately 2001, prior to the parties making improvements to the house and real
property; 5) the Property is located in Boulder, Utah; and 6|) Property is zoned
green belt/multiple use. (R. at 126-125). The zoning restrictions require no less
than five acres per home. (R. at 121-120). These facts were not disputed by Jepsen,
3

who never presented contrary testimony or other admissible evidence.1
In its Memorandum Decision of October 23, 2008, the district court
considered the facts established by Withers5 sworn testimony, as well as additional
facts asserted by Jepsen. (R. at 206-196). The district court ruled that Jepsen had
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and granted Withers5 Motion for
Summary Judgment. The court ruled as a matter of law and equity that, as a joint
tenant of the Property, Withers was entitied to partition and, because zoning
restrictions prevented the Property from being divided in a manner that would
allow two homes, the only reasonable solution was to sell it and divide the net
proceeds.
Following the issuance of the trial court's memorandum decision, Jepsen filed
a "Motion for Accounting55 and "Objections to Proposed Order.55 (R. at 219-214).
The Motion for Accounting contained a restatement of the facts contained in the
Affidavit and the "Other Important Facts55 and arguments contained in Jepsen5s

1

Jepsen did not file an affidavit or other admissible evidence to controvert
facts established by the Affidavit. Jepsen did not file a legal memorandum opposing
the summary judgment motion. Instead, he filed a document entitled "Objections
By Defendant to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment55 which included a
section called "Other Important Facts.55 (R. at 163-129). Jepsen5s "Other Important
Facts55 consisted of various statements from both parties5 depositions. Notably,
Jepsen did not dispute facts set forth in the Affidavit. Rather, Jepsen attempted to
argue that the "Other Important Facts55 created some issue of material fact.
4

other pleadings. The "Objections to the Proposed Order55 asked the court to set
aside the ordered sale because Withers failed to join the mortgagee. Jepsen also, for
the first time, asked for an accounting. (R. at 216-215). The district court denied
this motion, but ordered the sale of the property with an equal distribution of the
proceeds after satisfaction of the mortgage. (R. at 231-229).
B.

Statement of Facts.

Withers filed a motion for summary judgment supported by sworn, admissible
evidence in the form of an affidavit. Her Affidavit contained the following
undisputed material facts relevant to determining whether she is entitled to partition:
1.

Withers and Jepsen are joint tenants of the Property. (R. at 126).

2.

The property consists of a house on six acres. (E^. at 125).

3.

There is a mortgage on the property in the approximate amount of

$65,000.00. (Id.)
4.

The house and real property were appraised for $175,000.00 in 2001

prior to the parties making improvements to the house and ileal property. (Id.)
5.

The house and real property are located within DBoulder Town. (Id.)

6.

The lot on which the house sits is zoned green belt multiple use. (Id.)

Due to the zoning restrictions, residential homes require at least five acres of land.

5

(R. at 121-120).
Jepsen responded with the "Objections by Defendant to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment.55 (R. at 163-129). In this pleading, Jepsen did not dispute
Withers5 Affidavit, rather Jepsen agreed "the record title to the real property at issue
in this case is indeed vested in the names of the parties jointly,55 and included as an
exhibit, a copy of the executed quit claim deed listing Withers as an unmarried joint
tenant. (R. at 162, 147).
Jepsen5s Objections to Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment also
contained an itemization of Withers5 expenditures toward the Property, including
her payment of $15,290.00 on the mortgage. (R. at 157). Jepsen did not provide
the district court with any itemization of his expenses.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1201, when it is no longer desirable for
parties to remain joint tenants, one of the parties may seek partition. Further, cc[i]f
the court determines that the property or any part of it cannot be partitioned
without great prejudice to the owners, the court may order the property sold.55 Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-1212(l). In this case, the Property is zoned green belt multiple
use, which restricts residential structures to one unit per five acre parcel. Because of

6

this zoning restriction, the district court properly ruled that the Property could not
be physically divided in an equitable manner because one party would end up with a
house and five acres, and the other with one acre on which a house could not be
built. As an undisputed joint tenant, the trial court correctly ntded that Withers is
entitled to partition the Property and that equity was best served by selling the
Property and dividing the net proceeds equally.
Jepsen's argument on appeal that an oral contract existed between the parties
is barred by the statute of frauds. There is no writing between the parties providing
one would surrender their interest in the property should their relationship fail.
Indeed, the written document only establishes the contrary arrangement; the quit
claim deed creates an undisputed joint tenancy between two unmarried individuals.
Because there is no written agreement stating Withers would surrender her interest
in the Property should the personal relationship fail, Jepsen's Contractual claims are
barred by the statute of frauds and irrelevant to the partition action.
The law is clear that cc[i]n all cases, the interest of joint tenants shall be equal
and undivided.55 Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-5(4). As joint tenants, the parties are both
entitled to an equal and undivided share of the proceeds from the sale of the
property. Although Jepsen argued he was entitled to an accounting based on his
cc

facts and figures55, he never presented any figures other than those Withers
7

expended. Moreover, the district court considered Jepsen's arguments and
determined that an equal distribution of the sale proceeds was the equitable result.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
WITHERS WAS ENTITLED TO INVOKE THE PARTITION
STATUTE AS AN UNDISPUTED JOINT TENANT OF THE
PROPERTY.

The key inquiry is whether the district court correctly determined that Withers
was an undisputed joint tenant of the Property, thereby entitling her to partition.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §786-6-1201, cc[a] person who is a joint tenant . . .
may bring an action to partition the property . . . ." Indeed, "[a] co-tenant who has
properly invoked the aid of this statute is entitled to [partition or sale] as a matter of
right.53 Barrett v. Victors, 362 P.2d 586, 587 (Utah 1961).
The record unequivocally supports the district court's decision that Withers is
a joint tenant of the Property and entitled to partition. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-13 (2008), "[a] quit claim deed when executed as required by law shall have
the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and
to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges, and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, at the date of the conveyance.55 Further, "fee simple is
presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears
8

from the conveyance that a lesser estate was conveyed.55 Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-3
(1953). When interpreting deeds cc[i]t is the court's duty to construe the deed as it is
written.55 Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979).
Here, the quit claim deed, which Jepsen provided to the district court and is
attached hereto in the Addendum, conveyed the Property from Jepsen to Withers
and Jepsen as unmarried joint tenants. (R. at 147). The terms of the deed are
unambiguous, and uncontroverted.
Jepsen has never disputed the facts set forth in Withers5 Affidavit. In fact,
throughout the proceedings, Jepsen has agreed with the facts set forth in Withers5
Affidavit. In Jepsen5s objections he stated cc[t]he record title . . . is indeed vested the
names of the parties jointly.55 (R. at 162). Again, in Jepsen5s brief he states, cc[t]he
record title to the real property is vested in the parties jointly.55 (Aplt5s Br. at 5).
Because Withers is an undisputed joint tenant to the Property, she is entitled to
partition.
Jepsen5s "contract55 claim failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact because
it violates the statute of frauds and is irrelevant. Jepsen argues that "contract
principles can provide appropriate remedies to unravel the affairs of couples who

9

adopt the ways of marriage except the ceremony.55 (Aplfs Br. at 12) 2 . He argues a
marital contract was created between him and Withers when they allegedly agreed to
"jointly finance the home improvements with the new mortgage and [. . .] stay
together to jointly retire that obligation.55 (R. at 156). In this case, there is no
written agreement memorializing the alleged contract, and no legal precedent for the
court to impose a marital contract on joint tenants absent such a writing.
Pursuant to Utah's statute of frauds, a party cannot surrender an interest in
real property without a written conveyance. Section 25-5-1 provides:
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1(2008)
Jepsen has provided the court with no written agreement suggesting Withers agreed

2

Jepsen5s reliance on Edgar v. Wager\ 572 P.2d 405, 406 (Utah 1977) is
misguided because the court in Edgar only applied contract principles to award
money damages owed as a result of employment related issues. I d 406-407. It does
not support an argument that the court can impose a marriage contract on two
people who reside together. Moreover, the court in Edgar like the trial court here
relied on the partition statute and ordered the sale of the real property. I d (Three
parties were joint tenants to a house that was sold because partition was not feasible
without great prejudice).
10

to surrender her interest should their personal relationship fail. Accordingly,
Jepsen's alleged contract violates Section 25-5-1.
Because there is no written agreement, Jepsen attempts to manufacture an
agreement from statements pulled from the parties5 depositions. While Rule 56(e),
Utah R. Civ. P. allows parties to rely on pleadings and other discovery materials
when opposing a motion for summary judgment, when a motion for summary
judgment is supported by an affidavit the adverse party "may r^ot rest upon mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavit or as otherwise
provided by this rule, must set for specific facts showing this is a genuine issue for
trial.55 Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); See also. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah
1979).
Presumably, because there is no factual or legal basis for dispute, Jepsen
attempts to shift the focus away from Withers5 legal interest by arguing, "the whole
issue is whether Withers has any equitable claim to the property.55 (R. at 161).
However, to support this assertion, Jepsen relied on legal conclusions and irrelevant
statements pulled from the parties5 depositions:
Jepsen claims that he and Withers entered into a contract after
the divorce to jointly finance the home improvements with the
new mortgage and that they would stay together and jointly
retire that obligation. Jepsen deposition, page 20.
11

Withers breached her contract with Jepsen by having an
affair with Jeff Hansen, thus precipitating the separation
and the end of their relationship. Jepsen deposition, page
23-25.
(R. at 156) 3 .
Jepsen argues these "sworn statements] [are] sufficient to create an issue of
fact precluding summary judgment.55 (Aplt5s Br. at 10). As the district court
correctly concluded, however, these statements "contain only the Jepsen5s legal
conclusions, unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture and belief,55 and do not create a
genuine issue of material fact. (R. at 201). More importantly, these statements have
no bearing on Withers5 legal interest in the Property and are irrelevant to this
partition action.
A further sampling of Jepsen5s "facts55 reveals their insufficiency to support a
conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Jepsen5s "Other Important
Facts55 include historical allegations dating back to his prior marriage to Withers in
1991, information on Withers5 reproductive history, social security death benefits
paid to her on behalf of her prior husband, and a $5000.00 cash payment included
in the parties 5 1998 divorce decree. (R. at 160-159). Jepsen also places great weight

3

Even if the court accepted an agreement exists, Jepsen does not suggest
Withers agreed to forfeit her legal interest in the property if the relationship failed.
12

on the fact the parties were married and divorced for many yeats before he created
the joint tenancy. (Aplt's Br. at 10). However, a marriage that ended in 1998 has
no bearing on a joint tenancy created in 2001.
Despite the deficiencies in Jepsen's facts, the district court provided a
summary and analysis of all the facts presented in the pleadings, before classifying
Jepsen's "Other Important Facts" as "mere background facts" and not relevant to the
proceedings. (See Mem. Decision. R. at 203-201). Accordingly, based on Withers'
unopposed Affidavit and the rest of the record, the trial court correctly ruled that
Withers is an undisputed joint tenant and entitled to partition.
POINT II THE DISTRICT COURT D I D N O T ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT ORDERED THE PROCEEDS
FROM THE SALE TO BE EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN
THE JOINT TENANTS, AFTER SATISFYING THE
MORTGAGE OBLIGATIONS.
Pursuant to Utah's partition statute "partition may require the sale of the
property if it appears that the partition cannot be made without great prejudice to
the owners.55 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1201. "The fundamental objective in a
partition is to divide the property so as to be fair and equitable and confer no unfair
advantage on any of the cotenants.55 Blonquistv. Fmndsen, 694 P.2d 595, 596 (Utah
1984). The determination of whether a partition can be made "equally among the

13

parties . . . without prejudice to the rights and interests of5 the owners is a question
of fact. United Park City Mines Co., v. Stitching Mayflower Mountain Ponds\ 2006 UT
35,11 33 (Utah 2006). Partition actions are inherently equitable and an appellate
court will not "substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial court merely because [it]
may find a different result would be more appropriate.55 Arthur^ 574 P.2d at 725.
Furthermore, trial courts are "accorded broad discretion when fashioning [partition
decrees], and the decree will be affirmed unless the trial court abused its discretion.
Gillmor, 657 P.2d at 739.
In this case, the district court considered all the relevant factors before ruling
that selling the property and equally dividing of the net proceeds was an equitable
solution. Because of the zoning restrictions, the trial court determined that the
Property could not be legally or equitably divided without great prejudice to one of
the parties. Had the district court attempted to partition the Property, the zoning
restrictions would have left one person with a house and five acres and the other
with a one acre parcel with no possibility of constructing a home.
Jepsen argues the district court erred by not providing for equalization or
"owelty.55 In making this argument, Jepsen introduces Utah Code Ann. § 78B-61241, for the first time, then faults the district court for this error. Based on this
argument Jepsen asserts, that had the district court put the "facts and figures on the
14

table55 an equitable adjustment would have been made is his favor. (Aplt5s. Br. at
8) (Citing Barrett p. Vickers, 362 P.2d 586 (Utah 1 9 6 1 ) ( " ^ m ^ r 5 ) . This argument
is without merit.
Without addressing whether Jepsen has waived this argument, Jepsen5s
request for equalization fails because, "[ojwelty is an equitable alternative to [sale by
partition].554 See, United Park City Mines Co.y 2006 UT at 11 31. (Owelty is an
equitable alternative to judicially ordered sale of the property where both parties
desire to retain an interest in the property.); See also, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-61241 (equalization only applies when "a partition is ordered.55). In this case, because
of the zoning restrictions, the property could not be legally or equitably partitioned
without greatly prejudicing one of the parties. (R. at 198) 5 . Therefore, equalization
or owelty does not apply and the sale of the Property is the only equitable remedy
under the partition statute.
Withers is entitled to an equal share of the proceeds because the only written

4

Jepsen raises this argument for the first time on appeal and has, therefore,
waived it. Even so, § 78B-6-1241 only applies to parcels that can be partitioned and
since the property cannot be partitioned and must be sold the principle does not
apply in this case.
5

Because of the zoning restrictions, if one party had been granted the house
with the required five acres, the other party would have been left with one acre and
no ability to construct a residence on that acre.
15

documents unambiguously establish that Jepsen intended to convey an equal and
undivided interest in the Property to Withers. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-15(2)(a), the grantor must use the words "joint tenancy55 in the conveyance to create a
joint tenancy between unmarried individuals.6 Jepsen makes much of the fact that
Withers left him for another man, but marriage was not the basis for the joint
tenancy. Regardless, the success or failure of their relationship has no bearing on
Withers5 legal interest and does not diminish her interest.
Even if the court were to consider Jepsen5s untimely and nonresponsive
pleading submitted after summary judgment had been granted, they do not support
the result he seeks. In a flurry of pleadings filed on November 24, 2008, Jepsen
asked the court to set aside the summary judgment. For the first time, he asks for an
accounting. As the basis for his requested accounting, Jepsen provided the district
court with Withers5 itemized contributions, including $15,290.00 in mortgage
payments, yet failed to provide the trial court with an itemization of his alleged
payments. (Aplfs. Br. at 6, 10; R. at 157). Jepsen5s best attempt to show he paid
something toward the mortgage is the assertion that he "made up some of the

6

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 57-1-5(1)(a) joint tenancy is only presumed
between parties "who are designated as husband and wife in the granting documents
55

16

delinquent payments,55 without providing any figures for the court to consider.
(R. at 221). If anything, the facts and figures supplied by Jepsen support an
equitable adjustment in Withers5 favor.
Throughout these proceedings Jepsen has made it abundantly clear that he
thinks the law has treated him unfairly. In addressing post-partition decree claims of
unfairness, the Supreme Court has said cc[i]t is no evidence of inequity, as such, that
one of the co-tenants complains of unfairness once a decree of partition has been
made.55 Blonquist^ 694 P.2d at 596. While Jepsen clearly wishes for a different
result, there is nothing in the record suggesting the district court abused its
discretion by ordering the Property be sold and the net proceeds divided equally.
Moreover, Jepsen5s untimely and immaterial "facts and figures55 were reviewed and
considered by the district court in making its equitable decision and found to be
either immaterial or unpersuasive. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
ordering an equal distribution of the proceeds of the sale.

17

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Withers/Appellee respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the district court's judgment and order granting Withers5 Motion for
Summary Judgment against Jepsen.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/&

day of June, 2010.

WILLIAMS-^^HUNT

Dennis C. Ferguson
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Treena K. Withers

187751.1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

' "

day of June, 2010, two (2) true and

correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, along with a Courtesy
Brief on CD, were mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid thereon, to:
Marcus Taylor
671 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701

Dennis C. Ferguson
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225459
Security Title Company 00013008

ENTR

MA.LTAXNOnCB T O
Security Title Company
P. O. Box 177,15 North Main
Panguitch, UT 84759

ggg^^S^M^i^ J ^
rEF./fl.Oq _ . ^
RECORDER GARFIELD c d . UT
DEPUTY U x v x / L ^ V U i ^ L

Y NO. _l>ECORDEOfc!Sl, 20flt_AT £ 0 0 f vn

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
MARC J. JEPSEN Grantors
of BOULDER, County of GARFIELD, State of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to
MARC J. JEPSEN , AN UNMARRIED MAN AND TREENA A. WITHERS, AN UNMARRIED
WOMAN, AS JOINT TENANTS
Grantees of
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration the following tract of landl in
GARFIELD County, State of UTAH.

Beginning at a point 30 chains East and 15 chains South from the Northwest Corner of the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter Section 11, Township 33 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and running thence North 330 feet along the Dixie National Forest Boundary; thence West 660
feet; thence South 330 feet to a fence line; thence East 660 feet along said fence line to the point of
beginning.

WITNESS, the hand of said grantors, this 13 day of JUNE, A.D., 2001

MARC J. JEPSEN^ S

STATE OF UTAH
)S3.

COUNTY OF GARFIELD
On the » O day of
2001, personally appeared before me the above named person(s) arid
the signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me diat they executed the same
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My Commission Expires.
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